# Identity Center permission sets are central-only

An AWS account owner cannot edit an IAM Identity Center permission set. It lives in the management
account (or the delegated admin account), so every access nuance becomes a central ticket and, over time, a new group.

A team asks for a limited admin on one account. The central team creates a group and a permission
set, and recertifies both forever. In a large org the count grows with every request. Ours already
held 168 permission sets and 210 groups, with 130 permission sets each provisioned to a single
account, concentrated in 14 accounts (one had 28, another 24). None of it can be fixed by the account
owner.

The default groups are shared permission sets, not per-account ones. Admin and ReadOnly sat on
shared sets: the admin set across 48 accounts, the read-only set across 52, and that read-only set
also backed a 17-member read-only group. Adding one statement to the default ReadOnly changes every
account that uses it. A one-account pilot needs its own permission set.

The model that stops the pile-up: one read-only permission set for everyone, plus the ability to
switch into roles the account admins create. The permission set holds the managed ViewOnlyAccess
policy and an inline allow on the switch action, scoped to a role name prefix. ReadOnlyAccess stays
out, because it also reads data:

```
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
  "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/elevated-*"
}
```

Account admins create the elevated roles and name who may use them in the trust policy. The central
team manages one group, the same everywhere. Owners get freedom over roles without a ticket.

A few catches. The allow in the permission set is required, because with an account principal in the
trust policy both sides must permit it. A zero-policy permission set only works if the trust names
each exact SSO role ARN, `AWSReservedSSO_<permission-set>_<suffix>`, and that suffix changes when the
role is recreated, for example after every assignment in the account was removed and added again. To split people inside one group, key the trust on `aws:userid`, which ends with
the session name, instead of the shared role principal. And a restricted group next to a full admin
group enforces nothing, so the model only buys least privilege if full admin is removed afterwards.
Measure that overlap before you claim the benefit.

The switched session lasts at most one hour through role chaining, and users never need to know the
switch API call if the owner shares a pre-filled switch role link.
